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I. INTRODUCTION
In her seventeen years on the supreme court bench, Justice
Wahl has been involved in numerous decisions and has authored
over 400 opinions. To extract from this number only the "mon-
umental" decisions or to gauge the impact of her efforts is virtu-
ally impossible. Consequently, no pretense is made as to the
comprehensiveness of the scope of this review.
Upon reviewing her decisions, one is impressed with the
number of opinions that can be labeled as "firsts." One should
not be. As the first woman on the Minnesota Supreme Court,
Justice Wahl has brought a new vision to an old establishment.
t Author's credits go here.
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II. JURISPRUDENCE
A. On Disparate Treatment: Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386
N. W. 2d 715 (Minn. 1986)
In Sigurdson v. Isanti County,' Justice Wahl authored the first
Minnesota opinion requiring the lower courts to apply the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test in disparate treatment cases.2 The plaintiff
brought a disparate treatment claim alleging that her training
opportunities, assignments, and compensation were limited by
her gender.' The plaintiff also claimed that she was the victim of
reprisal for bringing discrimination charges.4
The employee filed her complaint with the Minnesota Human
Rights Department.5 This complaint was dismissed for lack of
probable cause,6 and the employee subsequently brought a civil
action under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.7 The lower
court did not find discrimination and ordered the plaintiff to
pay attorney fees.' The court of appeals affirmed the trial
1. 386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1986).
2. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell Doug-
las case specifically addressed disparate treatment based on race and formed a three-
part test for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 807.
3. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 716-19. The United States Supreme Court has de-
fined two basic types of employment discrimination cases: "disparate treatment" cases
and "disparate impact" cases. Disparate treatment cases involve allegations that the em-
ployer has treated "some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Id.
In the instant case, the claim is one of disparate treatment. Ms. Sigurdson claimed that
the county assessor's office treated her less favorably based on her gender. Sigurdson,
386 N.W.2d at 716.
4. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 716. Ms. Sigurdson's supervisor testified that typical
field appraisal work was done in teams. He was concerned that a man and woman team
would present a bad public image. Id. at 717. The facts of the case presented numer-
ous incidents of alleged harassment. Id. at 716-19.
5. Id. at 716.
6. Id. at 719.
7. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides that it is unfair employment prac-
tice "(a) to refuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment which unreasonably
excludes a person seeking employment; or... (c) to discriminate against a person with
respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or priv-
ileges of employment" because of an individual's sex. MINN. STAT. § 363.03 subd. 1(2)
(1992). This Act also provides that it is an unfair discriminatory practice to act in repri-
sal against an employee who brings a charge of employment discrimination. MINN.
STAT. § 363.03 subd. 7 (1992).
8. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 716.
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court's finding of no discrimination, but reversed the award of
attorney fees.9
On appeal, Justice Wahl remanded and instructed the lower
court on the three-part test established in McDonnell Douglas.1"
This test had been previously adopted in cases involving the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act11 and consists of a prima facie case, an
answer, and a rebuttal. 2 Justice Wahl, recognizing the impor-
tance of flexibility in applying this standard, noted that the spe-
cific elements of McDonnell Douglas must be altered depending
on factual patterns and employment settings. 3
In Sigurdson, the trial court decision did not enumerate the
particular elements of the McDonnell Douglas test. Justice Wahl
recognized the potential problems a loosely constructed analysis
could create and discussed her concerns:
Employment discrimination cases often involve intricate fac-
tual issues in which only the trial court ... can meaningfully
assess ... the evidence .... [The supreme court has] tradi-
tionally accorded great deference to the trial court in making
findings of fact... [however,] it is important that the basis for
the court's decision be set forth clearly and explicitly so that
an appellate court can conduct effective and meaningful
review. 14
The case was remanded with the requirement that the lower
court apply the correct standard and more explicitly detail the
decision. 5
9. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 363 N.W.2d 476, 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
10. The supreme court instructed the court of appeals to apply the McDonnell Doug-
las analysis for evaluating a disparate treatment claim. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 721-22.
11. The McDonnell Douglas standard was well-established in Minnesota. See, e.g.,
Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444-46 (Minn. 1983); Danz v.
Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 400 (Minn. 1978). Minnesota continues to apply this standard.
See, e.g., Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 1992).
12. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 720.
13. Id. at 720. Justice Wahl believed explicit application of fact-dependent tests was
necessary to accord deference to the lower court's findings of fact, "recognizing that
much must necessarily be left to [the trial court's] sound judgment and discretion." Id.
at 721.
14. Id. at 721.
15. Id. at 721-22. Sigurdson has since been cited in more than 30 Minnesota cases.
Sigurdson has also been cited in the Eighth Circuit. See Kypke v. Burlington N. RR., 928
F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Sigurdson and noting that Minnesota courts have
applied the same standards for discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act
that the federal courts have applied under federal anti-discrimination statutes).
1994l 1017
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The Sigurdson dissent strongly criticized the decision to re-
mand this case.16 Although agreeing that the lower court had
not articulated the McDonnell Douglas standard, the dissent advo-
cated for avoiding needless litigation and argued that judicial
energy would be wasted if the lower court were required to re-
draft the findings in accordance with the appropriate standard.17
Nevertheless, Justice Wahl refused to abandon the principles
of an effective appellate review and required a sound basis on
which to consider the reliability of a witness or the weight of the
testimony.18 She often chose to remand lower court decisions
that did not apply the correct standard 9 or made inconsistent
findings.2"
Justice Wahl continually emphasized the significance of fac-
tual issues in employment discrimination cases."' In addition,
she chose not to succumb to the pressures of avoiding litigation.
Although she recognized the legal system's struggle to avoid or
limit litigation, she also considered the importance of encourag-
ing lower courts to use correct standards and write clear deci-
16. Justice Yetka, authoring the dissent, concurred in the majority's affirming the
reversal of the award of attorney fees, but dissented in the order to remand for specific
findings under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 723.
17. Id. Justice Yetka stated:
At some point, litigation must come to an end. In this case, a remand will do
the appellant no good because the result will be the same .... We should
affirm this case, but warn that all findings in future employment discrimina-
tion cases are to be clearly set forth according to the McDonnell Douglas
analysis.
Id.
18. See, e.g., id. at 721 (stating that for appropriate appellate review a trial court
must "clearly and explicitly" set forth the court's basis for a decision).
19. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1993) (finding
that consent is a credibility issue for the trial court absent a clearly erroneous finding);
Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Minn. 1982) (reversing trial court findings
on the weight of testimony); Minnesota v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that the jury could not properly weigh evidence absent instruction on the
need to find intent to defraud).
20. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 1990) (holding jury
findings inconsistent); Wright v. M.B. Hagen Realty, Co., 269 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn.
1978) (holding findings inconsistent).
21. See, e.g., Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 707, 711 (Minn.
1992) (noting that breach of contract and age discrimination claims require factual
determinations by the jury); Shockney v. Jefferson Lines, 439 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn.
1989) (holding that no race discrimination occurred in discharge of employee when
treatment of all employees reviewed); Minneapolis Police Dep't. v. Minneapolis
Comm'n of Civil Rights, 425 N.W.2d 235, 239-40 (Minn. 1988) (finding lack of suffi-
cient evidence to establish prima facie case of employment discrimination); Lewis v.
Metro Transit Comm'n, 320 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn. 1982) (relying upon presentation
of substantial evidence establishing need for bona fide occupational qualification).
[Vol. 20
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sions. In Sigurdson, as in most of her decisions, she chose clarity
and completeness over convenience.
B. On Environmental Rights: Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N. W 2d
84 (Minn. 1979)
In 1979 the Minnesota Supreme Court, on first hearing, in an
opinion authored by Justice Wahl,22 decided the first case re-
garding historical preservation under the Minnesota Environ-
mental Rights Act (MERA).2S Powderly v. Erickson concerned the
MERA provision that protects buildings, structures, and sites
"possessing historical, archeological, or architectural value."24
In Powderly, a group of citizens brought an action under
MERA to enjoin the demolition of row houses in Red Wing, Min-
nesota. 25  These houses had been designated as "historic re-
sources" under MERA by the Minnesota Historical Society.26 In
spite of this designation, the property owner planned to demol-
ish the houses to provide for parking to expand a retail space.
The property owner argued at the trial level that there was no
feasible and prudent alternative to demolition that would effec-
22. Justice Otis authored the second decision. See Powderly v. Erickson, 301
N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1981).
23. MINN. STAT. § 116B.01-.13 (1992). For purposes of MERA, natural resources
are defined as "all mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude,
recreational and historical resources." MINN. STAT. § 116B.02 subd. 4 (1992). At the
time of the Powderly decision, no case had defined "historical resources" despite the
prevalence of local, state, and federal programs that addressed historical preservation.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-470t (1976); MINN. STAT. §§ 138.51-.65; 138.71-.75 (1978). Today,
guidance for MERA application is most frequently found in a trio of cases: Powderly v.
Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979); People for Envtl. Enlightenment and Responsi-
bility (PEER) v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978);
County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976). State v.
County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 422 (Minn. 1993).
24. Powderly, 285 N.W.2d at 88. A number of factors were indentified for considera-
tion in defining a historical resource: (1) who built the structure; (2) who lived in it; (3)
its location; (4) its architecture; (5) whether unique materials were used; (6) the quality
of workmanship; (7) the structure's association with builders or important people or
events in the area; and (8) its interaction with other buildings. Id.
In the opinion of Russell Fridley, Director of the Minnesota Historical Society and
State Preservation Officer, the row houses in question were historical resources because
of their age, construction, and association with local historical events. Id.
25. Id. at 85.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 86. The defendant, Erickson Diversified Corporation, operated a food
market, pharmacy, and gasoline service station. Id. The corporation purchased the
land adjoining the parcel on which the row houses stood in 1964. Id. In 1978, Erickson
sought and was awarded a demolition permit. Id. at 87.
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tuate the expansion plans28 and asserted that preventing the
demolition of the houses was an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty.2 '9 The district court found the row houses to be historical
resources but held that demolition was consistent with public
health, safety, and welfare because of building code and fire
safety violations.3 0
On first hearing,31 the supreme court determined that the re-
spondent, in raising the MERA affirmative defense, had failed to
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case.12 The court further deter-
mined that an injunction of the demolition was not an unconsti-
tutional taking because the injunction did not deprive the
respondent of all effective uses of the property.3  Therefore,
demolition of the row houses was enjoined and the case was re-
manded to the trial court.
34
The trial court modified the injunction and held that if there
was competent evidence that a reasonable time had lapsed and
the row houses had not been sold, renovated, or otherwise ac-
quired, demolition would be allowed.3 5  On rehearing, the
supreme court upheld the district court's modified injunction. 6
However, the supreme court remanded again and held that the
28. The property owner claimed there was a need for additional parking space and
that the expansion would not work without this space. Id. at 90.
29. Powderly, 285 N.W.2d at 87. Under MERA, the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing (1) the existence of a protectable natural resource, and (2) the pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction of that resource. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218,
228, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1973); MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1992). In the alterna-
tive, however, section 116B.04 allows a defendant who does not rebut the plaintiff's
case to raise an affirmative defense. Under MERA, the defendant may establish that (1)
there is no feasible and prudent alternative and that (2) the conduct at issue is consis-
tent with and reasonably required for the promotion of the public health, safety, and
welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of natural re-
sources. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04 (1992).
30. Powderly, 285 N.W.2d at 87.
31. The issues raised on appeal were: (1) whether the court erred in denying the
petition for intervention; (2) whether the row houses were historical resources; (3)
whether defendant had established an affirmative defense; (4) whether the demolition
permit was valid; and (5) whether defendant's property had been unconstitutionally
taken without just compensation. Id. at 87.
Appellate jurisdiction was with the supreme court prior to 1982. Since 1982, appel-
late jurisdiction has been divided between the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Min-
nesota Court of Appeal. See Court of Appeals Act, 1982 Minn. Laws ch 501, §§ 3-13
(codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 480A.01-.11 (1992)).
32. Powderly, 285 N.W.2d at 87.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Powderly v. Erickson, 301 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Minn. 1981).
36. Id. at 327.
1020 [Vol. 20
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respondent may apply for an order dissolving the injunction.
The continuing injunction was conditioned on the appellant's
posting a bond to indemnify respondent for damages resulting
from continued litigation.37
Justice Wahl carefully noted that Powderly did not determine
the application of MERA to "historic resources"3 in all situa-
tions.3 9 She wrote that the court had a duty to enjoin destruc-
tion of protected historic resources until parties interested in
preserving them have an opportunity to protect the resources
through legislative or administrative processes.
40
There is still no formal standard for interpreting MERA.41
However, Powderly proved a valuable starting point for defining
and labeling historic resources and property and the opinion set
the stage for what continues to be an important issue.4 2
37. Id.
38. Historic resources are not defined in MERA. However, in Archabal v. County
of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1993), the court discussed Powderly and the defi-
nition of "historic resources." "In Powderly... we identified certain factors that should
be taken into account in determining whether a building falls under the protection of
MERA. [Included is the] quality of significance in American history, architecture, ar-
cheology, and cultures ... local importance .. . integrity of location, design, setting,
materials, feeling and association." Id. at 421.
39. Powderly, 285 N.W.2d at 90.
40. Powderly, 301 N.W.2d at 324. She went on to state that in the absence of such
measures,
[W] here neither the owners nor any public body after a reasonable length of
time in which to act has lapsed, elect to preserve from demolition structures
which are historical resources, the owners have a constitutional right to de-
stroy the buildings or to put the property to any other lawful use, free from the
restrictions otherwise imposed ....
Id. Justice Wahl apparently knew the row houses would eventually be demolished but
chose to provide an opportunity for those interested to try to prevent the demolition.
41. One commentator has suggested that Powderly stands for the proposition that
economic considerations alone may allow MERA to be used as a defense under certain
circumstances. Timothy Murphy, Environmental Law-Protection of Scenic and Aesthetic
Resources under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act [State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451
N.W2d 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)], 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1190, 1200 (1991). Mr.
Murphy states, "the economic hardship limitation is ambiguous because it opens for
discussion the questions of when, if ever, economic considerations are truly 'alone.'"
Id. at 1201 (citing Bryden, Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice, 62 MINN. L. REV.
163 (1978)). "The question is whether the intent of MERA to ignore economic consid-
erations can be bypassed based on the 'social' concerns such as the livelihood of the
community. Id. at 1201 n.62. As he indicates, "it is not difficult to identify scenarios
where an activity otherwise damaging to the environment could be justified on grounds
that the activity could benefit local economies. Opponents of MERA could argue that
such benefits are 'social' rather than 'economic.' " Id. at 1201 n.63.
42. See, e.g., Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. 1993)
(citing Powderly as the standard for considering whether a structure is a historic re-
1994]
7
Roe: Justice Rosalie E. Wahl: Breaking New Ground
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
C. On Family Law: Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N. W.2d 705 (Minn.
1985)
In 1985, the Minnesota Supreme Court assessed the suitability
of the legal standards used to determine custody in child custody
cases. What began as a typical custody case,43 has become a
landmark decision in family law.
4
Justice Wahl, in Pikula, expressed the court's firm preference
for placement of a child with that child's primary caretaker.45
The opinion stressed the importance of the stability of the
child's relationship with the parent and the importance of con-
tinuing that relationship. 46 She reasoned that the "guiding prin-
ciple in all custody cases is the best interest of the child."
47
The Pikula trial court heard testimony that the mother
planned to move the children into her sister's apartment until
she was able to afford an apartment of her own.48 The father
source). The Archabal court applied the Powderly standard to determine the fate of the
Minneapolis Armory. Id.
43. If a custody case can ever be considered "typical."
44. As of March 1994, Pikula has been cited in 219 Minnesota cases, numerous
other jurisdictions, and thirty-three law review articles. See, e.g., Wopata v. Wopata, 498
N.W.2d 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating the Pikula developed a standard that serves
the best interests of the child); Westphal v. Westphal, 457 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (citing the well-settled policy under Pikula that stable custody is usually in the
child's best interest). See also In re Mr. & Mrs.J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988) (agree-
ing with the existence of a child's psychological parent and the importance thereof to
development of the child);Jaramillo v.Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991) (finding no
presumption in favor of the mother as primary caretaker); Ann Laquer Estin, Mainte-
nance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721, 784 n.236 (1993)
(citing Pikula for the proposition that even mothers who "work outside the home" can
be primary caretakers); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 C.Anozo L. REv. 1747, 1849 n.445 (1993) (discussing
the gender-neutral aspect of Pikula).
45. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985). The court followed the
reasoning of appellate decisions in Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See
In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (Ohio 1982); VanDyke v. VanDyke, 618 P.2d 465 (Or.
1980); Commenwealth ex. rel. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1982); Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
46. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711.
47. Id. Justice Wahl wrote that the importance of the emotional and psychological
stability to the child's sense of security is a notion that faces little dispute. Id. (citingJ.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 31-35 (1979); Martha F.
Leonard & Sally Provence, The Development of Parent-Child Relationships and the Psychologi-
cal Parent, 53 CoNN. B. J. 320, 326 (1979); Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or
Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RuTGERs L. REv. 1117, 1121-22 (1976) (cited in Ramsay
Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. Rxv. 335, 348 (1982))).
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711.
48. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 708.
[Vol. 20
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testified that he intended to remain in his home town and that
his mother would be the principle caregiver. 49 The trial court
placed the children, ages three and four, in the custody of the
father.5°
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded the placement was
erroneously premised on care by the father's extended family
and that the evidence was improperly ignored. 1 The court of
appeals overturned the lower court and awarded custody of the
children to the mother. 2 The supreme court affirmed the re-
versal of the choice of the father, but reversed in part the award
of custody to the mother.53 The court remanded for a determi-
nation as to the primary caretaker.
5 4
With guidance from other jurisdictions, Justice Wahl formu-
lated the Minnesota primary caretaker preference. 5 She stated
that the primary caretaker preference comported with the state's
welfare concerns in the face of the numerous interests enumer-
ated in the Minnesota multi-factor custody statute. 6
Emphasizing the importance of the child's bond to a primary
parent, she reasoned that four of the nine statutory interests
were essential to primary caretaking. 7 She found the remaining
49. Id. The father reported that his work schedule would sometimes keep him
away from the children from 3:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. As a truck driver, he had a
layover from 7:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. and, occasionally, he would be able to return
home during this time. Id.
50. Id. The trial court found that the father's strong, stable and religious family
group was "like a bedrock throughout the depression years and post-war years of plenty
and permissiveness. The environment has inbred in the family a unity, respect, loyalty
and love that for the most part has been destroyed and lost in most modem American
families." Id. at 709 (citing Trial Court Finding 11).
51. Pikula v. Pikula, 349 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The court specifi-
cally cited social worker reports showing that the mother was the primary caregiver and
that her care was best for the children. Id. at 326.
52. Id.
53. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 710-14.
54. Id. at 714.
55. Id. at 713-14 (adopting the indicia of primary parenthood set forth in Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981)). Justice Wahl was also guided by the appellate
decisions cited supra note 65.
56. "Four of the nine statutory criteria rest on the centrality of continuity of care
and environment to the best interest of the child." Piku/a, 374 N.W.2d at 711 n.1 (citing
MINN. STAT. § 518.17 subd. l(c-f) (1984)).
57. These four statutory best interests factors were: (1) the child's relationships
with others; (2) the adjustment to home and community; (3) the length of time in a
satisfactory placement; and (4) the permanence of family unity. Id. (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 518.17 subd. l(c-f) (1988)).
1994] 1023
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factors "inherently resistant of evaluation and difficult to
apply."1
8
Justice Wahl's opinion in Pikula involved more than just an
effort to establish the primary caretaker preference. Woven
throughout this opinion is her concern for promotion of cer-
tainty and a fear that the best interest standard may reflect the
individual standards of the decision-maker. 59 Justice Wahl ex-
pressed her concern with the ineffectiveness of appellate review
in custody cases by stating
The inherent imprecision heretofore present in our custody
law has, in turn, diminished meaningful appellate review. We
have repeatedly stressed the need for effective appellate re-
view of family court decisions in our cases, and have required
specificity in written findings based on the statutory factors
... . We are no less concerned that the legal conclusion
reached on the basis of those findings be subject to effective
review.
60
Pikula has since been the source of much citation, as well as
much criticism. 61 One well-known commentator has written that
"[i] n almost every aspect of its rationale, the primary caretaker
preference proved ineffective in Minnesota."62 That commenta-
tor's concern surrounded the failure to find a viable definition
of primary caretaker necessary to achieve the standards required
by the statute and the court.
63
58. Id. at 712.
59. This was not the first custody opinion that mandated highly particularized trial
court findings. In Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 249 N.W.2d 168 (1976), Justice
MacLaughlin noted that custody decisions by lower courts required particularized find-
ings to show both the consideration of statutory factors and that the decision was fairly
rendered. Id. at 82, 249 N.W.2d at 171.
60. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713.
61. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1990) (stating that
Pikula's primary caretaker preference is still the most important criteria in determining
the child's best interest); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn. 1988) (ac-
knowledging that Minnesota's multi-factor statute, MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1990), provid-
ing for a child's best interest means "all relevant factors," mandates a "multifaceted
inquiry" into all statutory factors).
62. Judge Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 452 (1990).
63. Id. Subsequent to Pikula, the Minnesota Legislature attempted to reject the
primary preference rule by declaring that the primary caretaker is only one of several
factors to consider in custody disputes. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 subd. 1 (1990).
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In 1988, the Minnesota Supreme Court retreated from its orig-
inal support of the preference.' Recently, however, there has
been renewed judicial support for the standard, evidencing the
continuing struggle in this area of the law.65
D. On Federalism: O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N. W2d 400
(Minn. 1979); In re Estate of Turner, 391 N. W 2d 767
(Minn. 1986); State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886
(Minn. 1991)
Justice Wahl is a staunch supporter of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion's applicability in criminal cases" and, as such, has authored
several opinions construing the state constitution expansively.
67
While not always the primary author of such opinions,68 Justice
64. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn. 1988).
65. In Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1990),Justice Wahl maintained
that "the golden thread running through any best interest analysis is the importance,
for a young child in particular, of its bond with the primary parent as this relationship
bears on the other criteria, such as the need for a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity." Id. at 223 (citing Rosenfield v. Rosenfield,
311 Minn. 76, 81, 249 N.W.2d 168, 170-71 (1976)).
The Legislature reiterated its intent to terminate the caretaker preference by re-
stating the 1989 prohibition against exclusive use of any statutorily based factor. "The
primary caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best
interests of the child." MINN. STAT. § 518.17 subd. 1 (1990).
66. See, e.g., Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985). In Nyflot, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to
label chemical testing under the implied consent statute (MINN. STAT. § 169.123 subd.
2(b) (1992)) as a critical stage because formal adverserial proceedings had not yet be-
gun. Id. at 515-16. Justice Wahl joined injustice Yetka's lengthy dissent characterizing
the majority's holding as an "intrusion on the dignity of the individual... [and] is more
akin to the laws prevailing in totalitarian states." Id. at 521.
67. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (holding that the
due process clause of the state constitution was violated by state statute imposing dispa-
rate penalties for possession of crack cocaine as opposed to powder cocaine).
68. See State ex rel. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (Minn. 1990) (holding
that the freedom of conscience clause protected defendant landlord from being penal-
ized for asserting right to exclude cohabitating tenants); State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d
379, 385-86 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the state constitutional right to ajury was vio-
lated by statute providing for six-person jury in misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor
cases); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the forcible
administration of drugs to an involuntarily committed patient without prior judicial
authorization was a constitutional violation of the right to privacy clause of the state
constitution); State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Minn. 1986) (holding that the
imposition of vicarious criminal liability for state liquor violations was an infringement
of the due process clause of the state constitution). In Hamm, Justice Yetka wrote,
"[w]hile a decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting an identical provi-
sion of the federal constitution may be persuasive, it should not be automatically fol-
lowed or our separate constitution will be of little value." Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 382.
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Wahl has written, and concurred in, a number of notable deci-
sions involving the state constitution.
1. O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W2d 400 (Minn. 1979)
In O'Connor v. Johnson,69 the supreme court invoked Article 1,
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. Section 10 states that
to be valid, a search warrant "must be based on probable cause,
be supported by oath or affirmation, and describe with particu-
larity the place to be searched and the items to be seized."70
The O'Connor case arose from an investigation into liquor es-
tablishments. The St. Paul police department had reason to be-
lieve that a local establishment falsified a liquor license
application." Relying on information from the establishment's
accountant, authorities believed the falsified records were in the
office of attorney O'Connor.7 2 The police obtained a search
warrant for O'Connor's office, but the attorney refused to allow
a search of his records on the grounds of the attorney work
product doctrine.7"
After being ordered to leave the records with the court,
O'Connor sought a writ of prohibition to quash the search war-
rant.74 Justice Wahl, writing for the court, examined the validity
of the search warrant:
This'case thus presents us with the very difficult and delicate
issue of reasonableness of searching an attorney's office for
documents and files of a particular client to find evidence of
criminal wrongdoing .... Even the most particular warrant
cannot adequately safeguard client confidentiality, the attor-
ney-client privilege, the attorney's work product, and the
criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel of all of
the attorney's clients. It is unreasonable, in any case, to per-
mit law enforcement officers to peruse miscellaneous docu-
ments in an attorney's office while attempting to locate
documents listed in the search warrant .... It will not unrea-
69. 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979).
70. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. Justice Wahl wrote, "[t]here is no question in the
instant case that the warrant is based on probable cause and supported by an affidavit.
We must decide, however, whether the proposed search was reasonable, even though
there was compliance with the literal terms of the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions ... ." O'Connor, 287 N.W.2d at 402.
71. O'Connor, 287 N.W.2d at 400.
72. Id. at 400.
73. Id. at 401.
74. Id.
1026 [Vol. 20
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sonably burden prosecutors' offices and effective law enforce-
ment to require officers to proceed by subpoena duces tecum
in seeking documents held by an attorney.75
She found the facts of O'Connor distinguishable from the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily;76 a case decided under the federal constitution. In
Zurcher, the Supreme Court relied on the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution which does not prevent a state
from issuing a warrant to search for evidence simply because the
owner or possessor is not reasonably suspected of criminal
wrongdoing.77 Hence, a search warrant is appropriate in these
situations.
78
Justice Wahl distinguished Zurcher on the grounds that, in that
case, the defendant newspaper had announced a policy of de-
stroying documents that could aid in the prosecution of protes-
tors.7 9 In O'Connor there was no indication that the attorney
would attempt to destroy the documents.8" This distinction obvi-
ated the need for a search warrant instead of a subpoena duces
tecum. 81
She further distinguished O'Connor by focusing her analysis on
the state constitution:
A more important distinction between this case and Zurcher is
that our decision rests not only on the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, but also on Article I, section
10 of the Minnesota Constitution. The states may, as the
United States Supreme Court has often recognized, afford
their citizens greater protections than the safeguards guaran-
teed in the Federal Constitution. Indeed, the states are inde-
pendently responsible for safeguarding the rights of
citizens.
82
Thus Justice Wahl diverged from the United States Supreme
Court in interpreting the requirements for a search warrant, and
75. Id. at 404-05.
76. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
77. Id. at 565-66.
78. Id. The Zurcher court held that a rule denying a search warrant for the premises
of a third party and requiring a subpoena duces tecum was not constitutionally man-
dated. Id. at 560.
79. O'Connor, 287 N.W.2d at 405.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 408 (citations omitted).
19941
13
Roe: Justice Rosalie E. Wahl: Breaking New Ground
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WLLMAM MITCHELL LAW REV!EW
the O'Connor decision demonstrated her continued support for
an independent state constitution.
2. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N. W.2d 767 (Minn. 1986)
In In re Estate of Turner,a5 the supreme court upheld the consti-
tutional validity of an estate collection statute allowing the state
to recover from a decedent's estate any medical assistance pay-
ments made to the decedent after the decedent's sixty-fifth
birthday.84 Former Chief Justice Amdahl authored this opinion
which explored whether the statutory provision in question was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest and thus was not
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection."5
The opinion suggested an intent to treat the federal guarantee
of equal protection coextensively with the state guarantee of
equal protection."6 This view was addressed in a footnote that
stated "the rational basis standard used in Minnesota equal pro-
tection analysis is the same as the standard used in federal equal
protection analysis."87
Justice Wahl concurred specially in the Turner decision. 8
While agreeing that the statute would pass muster under both
the Minnesota and federal constitutions, she was concerned that
the Turner footnote "perpetuates confusion and continues a 'bat-
tle of footnotes' " regarding the rational basis test.8"
83. 391 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1986).
84. Id. at 770 (upholding MINN. STAT. § 256B.15 (1986)).
85. Id. at 768.
86. Lisa Weinke, Note, Invoking the State Constitution to Invalidate Legislation: Who's
Guarding the Guardians?, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1992).
87. Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 770 n.2 (citing AFSCME v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560,
569 n.lI (Minn. 1983) (stating "the prohibition against arbitrary legislative action em-
bodied in the state equal protection clause, Minn. Const. art. I, § 2, the state uniformity
clause, Minn. Const. art. X, § 1, and the state special legislation clause, Minn. Const. art.
XII, § 1, are coextensive with those afforded by the federal equal protection clause, U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1")).
88. Id. at 771.
89. Id. She wrote,
By footnote in a 1981 opinion, Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d
273, 281 n.14 (Minn. 1981), we indicated the rational basis standard under the
Minnesota constitution differed from the federal standard. By footnote in
1982, AFSCME v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983), we
stated that the federal and Minnesota state standards were "coextensive." By
footnote in 1984, in McGuire v. C & L Restaurant, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 613
n.10 (Minn. 1984), we again declared that the state and federal standards are
different.
Id. at 771.
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Justice Wahl was troubled by the existence of conflicting foot
note statements that left the legal community uncertain about
the relationship between the state and federal rational basis stan-
dards. She stated, "[t] o say that the wording of the rational basis
test in Minnesota case law merely represents a different way of
stating an identical federal test.., distorts and minimizes signifi-
cant distinctions in .. .Minnesota cases [that] have applied ra-
tional basis analysis."9"
The justice concluded her concurrence with a query to the
court: "I would question whether we should harness interpreta-
tion of our state constitutional guarantees of equal protection to
federal standards and shift the meaning of Minnesota's constitu-
tion every time federal case law changes.""1
Turner provided an opportunity for Justice Wahl to present
her definition of the Minnesota rational basis standard and to
distinguish this test from the federal rational basis test. She in-
sisted that the independent Minnesota constitutional standard
be adopted in order to "move toward realism and protection of
constitutional rights, [the] court's proper function."92
3. State v. Russell, 477 N.W2d 886 (Minn. 1991)
In State v. Russell,93 Justice Wahl had occasion to respond to
the query she raised in Turner. The Russell court articulated and
applied the independent Minnesota constitutional rational basis
standard.94 Justice Wahl, writing the majority opinion, cited her
final query in Turner and added that the continual shift in mean-
90. Id. at 771 (citing Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138, 142
(Minn. 1980) (providing the framework for the Minnesota rational basis test)).
91. Id. at 773. Justice Wahl acknowledged that scholars disagree as to whether a
state court's interpretation of a state constitutional requirement of equal protection
should be tied to a similar provision in the federal constitution. Id. (citing a compari-
son between authors favoring the federal-state uniformity and those favoring independ-
ent state standards).
92. Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 773.
93. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
94. Id. at 888. The court delineated a three-prong test:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification
from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be
genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to
justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classifica-
tion must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of law; that is there must be
an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and
the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that
the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.
Id. (quoting Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn. 1981)).
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ing of the equal protection standards would "undermine the in-
tegrity and independence of our state constitution and degrade
the special role of this court, as the highest court of a sovereign
state, to respond to the needs of Minnesota citizens."95
In Russell, the court upheld the invalidation of a state statute
imposing a greater penalty on possession of cocaine base as op-
posed to powder base.96 The defendants moved to dismiss the
charges on the grounds that the statute violated federal and state
guarantees of equal protection.9 The trial court applied the
federal rational basis test 98 and invalidated the statute on the
grounds that there was no rational basis for the statutory
classification.99
Justice Wahl's opinion recognized that a rational basis stan-
dard was applicable, but reasoned that the state guarantee of
equal protection imposed a greater test of scrutiny than did the
federal constitution. 100 However, in a forceful dissenting opin-
ion Justice Coyne argued that the Supreme Court has, with a few
exceptions, treated the federal and state equal protection clauses
similarly. 10 ' Citing Turner, Justice Coyne noted that the court
has determined that the rational basis standards are the same
and a review by the Court would be substantive at best.'
0 2
95. Id. at 889 (citing In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 773 (Minn. 1986)).
96. Id. at 888. MINN. STAT. § 152.03 subd. 2 (1989) provided in part:
A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the third degree if:
(1) the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures of a weight of three
grams or more containing cocaine base;
(2) the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures of a total weight of
ten grams or more containing a narcotic drug.
Id.
97. Russell 477 N.W.2d at 887.
98. Id. The federal rational basis test requires (1) a legitimate purpose for the
challenged legislation, and (2) that it was reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that
use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose. Western & S. Life Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 S. Ct. 2070, 2083 (1981).
99. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
100. Id. She wrote,
Even if we were to agree with the state's argument as to the analysis under the
federal test, we strike the statute as unconstitutional under the rational basis
test as articulated under Minnesota law. Since the early eighties, this court
has, in equal protection cases, articulated a rational basis test that differs from
the federal standard.
Id.
101. Id. at 895.
102. Id. at 902. Justice Coyne stated:
The argument that Minnesota applies a rational basis test that differs from the
federal standard has been put to this court before and emphatically rejected
.... What the majority has actually done here is to engage in substantive
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That Russell and other recent supreme court decisions 03 have
met with severe criticism from the bench10 4 suggests that the
supreme court is polarized on the issue of whether or not the
Minnesota Constitution should be expansively interpreted.
1 0 5
With Justice Wahl departing the bench, there may be a move-
ment toward judicial restraint. However, Justice Wahl has left a
long line of majority and dissenting opinions that cannot be
overlooked should the court seek to move away from independ-
ent constitutional interpretation.
III. CONCLUSION
Justice Wahl's decisions over the past seventeen years have had
an effect in many areas, most notably in criminal constitutional
law. That Justice Wahl has had her share of dissenters should
come as no surprise. She is strong in her convictions and
thoughtful in her decisions. These are traits that can breed con-
flict. Justice Wahl will, however, be missed on the bench. From
the depth and expanse of her opinions, one can see that she
successfully sharpened the vision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court with the "second lens" she brought to the court.
review-the kind of review epitomized by Lochner v. New York .... In short,
substantive review replaces an appropriate standard of review, not with a
stricter standard, but with no standard at all.
Id.
103. See, e.g., Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.
1991) (holding that under the Minnesota Constitution the right to counsel attaches at
the time of arrest) (Coyne, J. & Keith, C.J., dissenting)).
104. In Friedman, Justice Coyne dissented emphatically in arguing that Nyflot v. Com-
missioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985) was controlling in the instant
case:
Denying what seems to me the clear import of Nyflot, the majority has neither
articulated a satisfactory rational for disregarding the decision nor proposed a
sound basis for interpreting the Minnesota constitution .... Bluntly stated,
the majority has made no attempt to explain why a person arrested for drunk
driving is entitled to special treatment: until today at least, no one arrested for
any other crime has been accorded a constitutional right to consult a lawyer
before submitting to a search.
Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 838 (citations omitted).
105. See Weinke, supra note 101, at 1081 n.53. This same author suggests that the
tension between Justice Coyne on the one hand and Justices Wahl and Yetka on the
other was also apparent in State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1985). Weinke, supra
note 101, at 1080 n.40. In Fuller, the court had an opportunity to use the state constitu-
tion to extend the double jeopardy doctrine. While acknowledging the right to use the
state constitution, the court refused to do so. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 726-27. Justice Wahl
dissented and argued that the court should not be inhibited from exercising the right
and responsibility to apply the independent protection of the state constitution. Id. at
727 (citing WilliamJ. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977)).
1994]
17
Roe: Justice Rosalie E. Wahl: Breaking New Ground
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss4/3
